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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019

TAGS: KACT PARM MARR PREL RS US START  
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA  
(SFO-GVA-IV): (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, SEPTEMBER  
2, 2009 SESSION

REF: A. STATE 90239  
1B. STATE 88262/88263  
1C. STATE 88259/88260  
1D. GENEVA 0616 (SFO-GVA-III-001)  
1E. GENEVA 0617 (SFO-GVA-III-002)  
1F. STATE 84678  
1G. STATE 94672 (SFO-GVA-IV-004)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-006.

12. (U) Meeting Date: September 2, 2009  
Time: 3:30 - 5:10 p.m.  
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

3: (S) At the final meeting of this session, A/S Gottemoeller returned to the issue of the Russian-proposed language on "Equal Security." Gottemoeller explained that there are different ways to speak about equal security. There could be ways to talk about it if both Sides agreed on the concept. However, the phrase "Equal Security had a long history and "a lot of baggage." It would be better if it were possible for the Parties to find a formulation that our Presidents have used over the past several months.

14. (S) Gottemoeller also said that the United States still believes telemetry has a significant role to play in the new treaty. Telemetry, she underscored, is beneficial to both Sides, in terms of transparency regarding future programs and new types of ballistic missiles. Antonov said the Russian Delegation would study the points made by the U.S. Delegation.

15. (S) Antonov announced the Russian concept for four working groups and their chairs: Treaty Text and Definitions, chaired by Mr. Koshelev; Inspections, chaired by Col Ilin; Conversion or Elimination and Notifications, chaired by Col Ryzhkov; and, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), chaired by Gen Orlov.

16. (S) In addition, the focus of the first week of work for the September 21 session was discussed. Antonov wanted to understand what the work schedule for the Delegations would be; would it be necessary for all the Delegation to be present or just the Heads of Delegation? Gottemoeller said that the United States planned to have the full Delegation present to begin work on September 21. She said it was important for the working groups to begin their work to pull together the Joint Draft Text (JDT). Gottemoeller reminded Antonov that their ministers would be meeting in Moscow during the middle of October and the negotiators would need to report on the progress of the START Follow-on Negotiations.

17. (S) Antonov closed by providing the United States Delegation with a copy of the Russian Press Statement, saying that the fifth (SIC) round of negotiations had been held August 31 - September 3 (text of official translation is in para 23). Discussion of the future agreement was continued as the Parties began deliberation on specific articles of the treaty and beginning the work in working groups. The Parties agreed to continue their discussions later in September in Geneva.

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OPENING REMARKS  
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18. (S) Gottemoeller began the afternoon session with a discussion of when the various working group chairs would meet. After a brief discussion, it was decided that the Treaties and Definitions Working Group with Ries and Koshelev, the Inspection protocol with Warner and Ilin, and the Conversion or Elimination and Notification Working Group with Elliot, Siemon and Smirnov (Begin note: Ryzhkov, who will be the Russian Chair, was not at this session. End note.) would meet at the conclusion of the session. The MOU Working Group Chairs with Trout and Orlov elected not to meet since they had a long discussion at the U.S.-hosted reception (REF G).

19. (S) Gottemoeller turned to Siemon to offer U.S. views on the importance of telemetry. Siemon offered the following Points.

Begin Points::

- The exchange of telemetric data provides the throw-weight information required for determining new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, or for determining whether modifications of an existing type of ICBM or SLBM exceed the new type criteria. In addition, the United States believes that an exchange of telemetric information as a confidence-building measure will enable the Sides to more accurately determine the capabilities and potential reentry vehicle deployment practices for existing and new ICBMs and SLBMs, which would further strengthen predictability and strategic stability.

- The United States recognizes that limitations under START that telemetry verified have not been carried forward. However, the United States believes that the 15 years of implementing START's telemetry provisions have allowed us to develop and utilize a robust set of measures that could be adopted in a straightforward manner to support transparency and confidence building. We believe the Sides should continue to take advantage of that experience.

- From a slightly broader perspective, both the United States and the Russian Federation have decided the future treaty should only have overall limitations and not carry

forward the START Treaty's sub-limitations. This raises the question about whether we should maintain the same level of predictability and strategic stability that has existed under START. If there is a desire to maintain that level of predictability and strategic stability, then the same level of transparency into each other's strategic forces will have to continue to be maintained as existed under START. Because the U.S. view is that we should maintain the same level of predictability and strategic stability, we have included many of the START Treaty's transparency and confidence-building measures. As a consequence, this includes those measures that apply to the provision of telemetry.

End Points.

¶10. (S) Gottemoeller concluded by stating the United States still believes telemetry has a significant role to play in the new treaty. Telemetry, she underscored, is an applicable benefit to both Sides, in terms of transparency into future programs and new types of ballistic missiles. The new treaty will allow both Sides to develop new ballistic missiles and telemetry is not a unilateral advantage. As such, the ban on telemetric encryption should be carried forward to the new treaty.

¶11. (S) Antonov thanked the United States for its presentation and said the Russian Side would make the commitment to prepare its counter-arguments to present at the next round of discussions.

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AND EQUAL SECURITY FOR ALL  
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¶12. (S) Gottemoeller explained why the U.S. Side did not include the Russian preferred phrase "equal security" in the preamble of its proposed Draft Joint Text (REF B). She said that neither the United States nor the Russian Side would enter into negotiations to constrain their Strategic Offensive Forces unless they each believed it was in the interest of their own national security. So, in principle, she said the United States agreed with the philosophy espoused in the Russian use of the phrase of equal security. However, she continued, words have a history of their own and, for the U.S. Side, the phrase "equal security" had a history that had strayed into the realm of propaganda. As such, the Sides needed to find a new formulation that expressed the same point without the baggage.

¶13. (S) Gottemoeller concluded by offering that the Presidential Joint Statement of April 1, 2009 contained a useful expression: "The new agreement will mutually enhance the security of the parties...." In sum, she concurred that no agreement could be reached with concerns that such a treaty did not ensure the security of both nations, but that concept must be expressed in a way that would not be misunderstood.

¶14. (S) Antonov responded that he heard Gottemoeller mention that the phrase "equal security" had a long history but was not sure if she meant it had a positive or negative connotation. In regard to the Presidential Joint Statement from April 1, he took part in those negotiations and the Russians had offered the phrase "equal security," but the U.S. Side had replaced it and did not offer an explanation. Because the Russian Side had felt pressure to achieve a positive result from the meeting, they had accepted the U.S. formulation. He said he was still unclear why the United States did not accept the Russian formulation. He expressed concern that the United States wanted greater security out of the new treaty than what Russia received. He mentioned that there had been treaties that did not grant equal security (the treaty after the Nazi capitulation) but if the United States and Russia are equal partners, the new treaty needs to treat both equally. He tasked his legal expert to look through

international documents to find examples to outline their approach.

¶15. (S) Gottemoeller replied that there was no difference in concepts. She reiterated that the term "equal security" had a negative connotation in the United States, but welcomed other Russian formulations the United States could accept. She tasked Brown to do homework on the concept as well.

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ORGANIZATIONAL DISCUSSION  
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¶16. (S) Antonov asked about the late September session and whether initial meetings required all of the Delegation members to be present or just some. Gottemoeller replied that the Sides needed to begin work quickly to develop a working schedule and that they should bring full Delegations. Gottemoeller confirmed the four groups that the Russians proposed: Treaty Articles, Inspections, Conversion or Elimination and Notifications, and MOU. Gottemoeller noted that the work on Notifications and MOU were dependent on the other three working groups so they could, perhaps, meet later. However, the rest of the working groups needed to begin their discussion on the substance and text on September 21. If one or two members cannot make it, the schedule could be rearranged, as appropriate.

¶17. (S) Antonov again asked whether the Heads of Delegation needed to reside in Geneva during the majority of the time. He told Gottemoeller that the Russian Chair for the Treaty Working Group, Koshelev, was not going to be able to arrive in Geneva until the week of September 27. If there were not going to be plenary sessions, in his view, the whole Delegation did not need to be in Geneva. He requested that Gottemoeller prepare a program of work so the Russian Side could review and offer a counter-proposal. Antonov also wanted to know when the presence of the Heads of Delegation was required to discuss key issues and he rattled off three:

- Interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.
- Clarification of the Russian proposal on the treaty followed by a discussion on the basis of work for a new text.
- Ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration  
-- further examination of both the Russian and U.S. positions

¶18. (S) Antonov wondered what the working groups could do until these issues were resolved. He did not know whether the big issues should be resolved first or should the working groups resolve the easier issues first. He stated that he was not coming to any conclusions just outlining his concerns. He also wondered how the issues that were interdependent between the groups might be resolved.

¶19. (S) Gottemoeller responded by explaining her view of the role of the Heads of Delegation:

- 1) Setting the priorities on the substance of the treaty negotiations.
- 2) Providing guidance to working groups addressing key questions.
- 3) Tackling the issue of comprehensiveness (work in one group is accounted for in another).
- 4) Bringing to resolution the key issues in the treaty--such as counting rules.

¶20. (S) Gottemoeller also stated that it was crucial for

the working groups to meet the week of September 21 to begin creating a Joint Draft Text from which the Sides could begin negotiations. She also mentioned that the Sides should assess their work a month into the meeting to inform their leadership as to the progress, and assess what areas the leadership needed to address. She told Antonov that she would provide a proposed work plan and thought the work could be done via another "hybrid approach" -- plenary sessions to discuss the major issues and working groups to address the detailed discussions. Antonov said the concept was interesting. Gottemoeller reminded Antonov that they have the history of START to build from and looked forward to hearing his thoughts.

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HOMEWORK ASSIGNMENTS  
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¶21. (S) Gottemoeller reviewed what the U.S. Side would provide to the Russian Side around September 14:

-- Conversion or Elimination Protocol  
-- Memorandum of Understanding Protocol  
-- Telemetry Protocol  
-- Annexes to the Inspection Protocol

-- Procedures for the Bilateral Consultative Commission

On the last point, Antonov thought that since the United States accepted the concept of the BCC, then it should just accept the Russian proposal prepared by Ms. Ivanova (REFS D and E). Brown replied that the U.S. Side would offer a proposed Joint Draft Text in response to the excellent draft from the Russian Side. Antonov also stated that he did not think it was necessary for the United States to provide a Telemetry Protocol. Gottemoeller told him she hoped the U.S. proposal would enlighten him.

¶22. (S) Antonov said he still had several questions about how to organize for the work ahead. He stated they were still working on the Russian text of the complete treaty and hoped it would be ready to hand over prior to the next session. If not, the Russians would continue to make presentations on separate articles as they were ready.

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MEDIA NOTES  
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¶23. (S) Antonov presented a draft press release (text of official translation follows below) that the Russian Delegation planned to release that summarized the work of the session. He did so to ensure that the U.S. Side was not surprised.

Begin text:

Official Translation

Negotiations between Russia and  
the United States on Working Out  
a New Agreement to Replace the  
START Treaty - Fifth Round

(Geneva, August 31 - September 3, 2009)

Draft

PRESS RELEASE

on the Fifth Round of Russian-U.S. Negotiations in  
Geneva on Working Out a New Agreement to Replace the  
START Treaty

The fifth round of Russian-U.S. negotiations on strategic offensive arms took place in Geneva from August 31 to September 3.

Discussion of key provisions of the future agreement continued. The Parties proceeded to elaborate specific articles of the treaty and agreed to refer the discussion of military and technical problems to working groups.

They agreed to continue the negotiations in Geneva in late September of this year.

End text.

¶24. (U) Gottemoeller said she could not take issue with anything contained in the statement.

¶25. (U) Documents exchanged,

- Russia:

-- Russian-proposed Media statement, undated.

¶26. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller  
Amb Ries  
Mr. Brown  
Mr. Buttrick  
LtCol Comeau  
Mr. Dunn  
Mr. Elliott  
Ms. Friedt  
Col Hartford  
Mr. Johnston  
Mr. Siemon  
Mr. Taylor  
Mr. Trout  
Dr. Warner  
Mrs. Zdravecky  
Ms. Gross (Int)  
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov  
Mr. Koshelev  
Col Ilin  
Ms. Ivanova  
Mr. Izrazov  
Ms. Kotkova  
Mr. Leontiev  
Mr. Luchaninov  
Mr. Malyugin  
Mr. Neshin  
MGen Orlov  
Col Pischulov  
Mr. Rudenko  
Mr. Semin  
Mr. Shevchenko  
Mr. Smirnov  
Mr. Tarasov  
Mr. Vasiliev  
Gen Venevtsev  
Mr. Vorontsov  
Mr. Gayduk (Int)  
Ms. Brokhovich (Int)  
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

¶27. (U) Gottemoeller sends.

CLINTON